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POWER TO HOLD STOCK IN OTHER CORPORATIONS

T

65

power of corporations to hold stock in other corporations
has been the subject of many decisions and much legislation.
Some courts hold that corporations have the power to take and
hold the shares of other corporations without express statutory or
charter authorization. 66 On the other hand, the Illinois courts held
HE

in a series of decisions, of which People v. Chicago Gas Trust Co.

67

is typical, that the holding of stock in one corporation by another
is contrary to public policy, and that a corporation's articles may
not provide for such holding in the absence of express statutory
authority.""
Between these two extreme views the weight of judicial au*Of the New York Bar; formerly Professor of Law, University of

Minnesota.
tContinued
from 17
65

MINNESOTA LAW Rivmnw 689, 703.
Minnesota Business Corporatibn Act, Minnesota Laws 1933, ch. 300.
"Sec. 9. When so provided in its articles of incorporation a corporation
may acquire, hold, mortgage, pledge or dispose of the shares, bonds, securities and other evidences of indebtedness of any domestic or foreign corporation; and, without such authority in its articles, may guarantee, acquire,
hold, mortgage, pledge or dispose of the shares, bonds, securities and other
evidences of indebtedness of any domestic or foreign corporation when
reasonably necessary or incidental to accomplish the purposes stated in its
articles."
"6Booth v. Robinson, (1880) 55 Md. 419; White v. Marquardt & Sons,
(1898) 105 Iowa 145, 74 N. W. 930.
67(1889) 130 Ill. 268, 22 N. E. 798, 8 L. R. A. 497.
08it should be noted that the Illinois General Corporation Act, adopted
in 1919, provides that Illinois corporations shall have power "to own, purchase or otherwise acquire, whether in exchange for the issuance of its own
stock, bonds, or other obligations or otherwise, and to hold, vote, pledge.
or dispose of the stocks, bonds, and other evidences of indebtedness of any
corporation, domestic or foreign." Illinois Laws 1919, p. 318, sec. 6 (6).
It is thus apparent that the Illinois rule referred to has been changed by
statute.
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thority in this country is to the effect that: (1) a corporation may
take and lold stock in another corporation when it is expressly
authorized in its articles so to do ;69 and (2) a corporation has
implied power so to take and hold stock in another corporation if
(but only if) the purchase is a necessary or reasonable means of
purposes.I
carrying out, its stated
It should be added that the tendency of the more recently
adopted codes is to broaden the rules of the decided cases in this
connection. Thus-the California- law provides that every corporation shall have power "to acquire, subscribe for, hold, own, pledge
and otherwise dispose of and vote shares of stock, bonds and
securities of any other corporation, domestic or foreign."'" Substantially similar provisions are found in the Delaware,7 2 Ohio,3
Louisiana,7 4 Michigan7 - and Indiana laws.
The Minnesota committee, however, thought that the recent
tendency last referred to has gone perhaps too far in making all
corporations in effect holding corporations without reference to
their articles or purposes. From a reading of its provisions it is
apparent that what has been done in the Minnesota Act is to incorporate therein what is the weight of judicial authority on this
question.7 7 While there are no Minnesota decisions contra to the
provisions of -the new act in this' connection," it was thought
desirable definitely to state the rules in the statutes as to a matter
of so great importance. The result here reached, while more conservative than that followed in the other recently adopted codes, is
believed by the committee to go as far as is necessary in this connection in the public interest.
9

Market Street Railway Co. v. Hellnian, (1895) 109 Cal. 571, 42 Pac.

6

225.

See Machen, Corporations 57.
7 Farmers State Bank v. Richter, (1922) 48 N. D. 1233, 189 N. W.
242. See Ballantine, Corporations 220, 221.
7'California General Corporation Law, Sec. 341 (10), California, Civil
0

Code, (Deering's 1931) sec. 341 1(10).
72
General Corporation
73
Ohio, General Code,
74

Law of Delaware, ply. 79 and 80.
(Page 1931) sec. 8623-8.
Louisiana Laws 1928, Act. 250, sec. 12.

75

Michigan General Corporation Act, sec. 10 (i), Michigan, Public Acts

1931, p. 572 sec. 10 (i).
7
6Indiana General Corporation Act, sec. 3 (7), Indiana Laws 1929, p.
727 sec. 3 (7).
7
7See cases cited in notes 69 and 70, supra.
7"See Baldwin v. Canfield, (1879) 26 Minn. 43; 1 N. W. 261; Hunt v.
Hauser Malting Co., (1903) 90 Minn. 282, 96 N. W. 85; Olson v. Warrod
Mercantile Co., (1917) 136 Minn. 310, 161 N. W. 713.
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DURATION OF CORPORATE EXISTENCE

By the common law rule a corporation has the capacity of perpetual succession, 0 and the new Minnesota Act follows the Uniform Act"' and the recently adopted codes which our committee
used for comparison8 2 in reenacting the common law rule. Prior
to the adoption of the new Act, with an exception as to savings
banks and railroad companies, Minnesota business corporations
might be formed for a period "not exceeding thirty years in the
first instance"8' 3 but with the right of renewal from time to time
for further like periods upon a three-fourths stock vote approval
"when those desiring it [the renewal] shall have purchased at its
8' 4
value the stock of those opposed thereto."
Curiously enough the supreme court has not had to determine
what constitutes "value" in connection with the statute authorizing
renewals. It seems certain, however, that the lack of definiteness
in the statutory language in this connection, added to the fact that
no procedure is set out for determining value in those cases where
an agreement cannot be reached, must have had at least some
influence in the incorporation of Minnesota businesses elsewhere.
But, these things aside, there is still the question of the propriety
of permitting perpetual succession to corporations. To permit
such succession is not believed to be contrary to any fundamental
policy of the state, and in view of the liberal provisions of sections

48 and 49 of the new Act permitting shareholders to institute
involuntary proceedings for dissolution it will not prejudice shareholders where there have been managerial abuses. All things considered the committee thought it desirable to obviate this cause of
incorporation elsewhere, and thus to place Minnesota in accord
79 Minnesota Business Corporation Act, Minnesota Laws 1933, ch. 300.
"Sec. 8. Every corporation shall have power:
(a) To continue as a corporation for the time limited in its articles
of incorporation,
or, if no such time limit is specified, then perpetually."
8
sSee Fletcher, Cyc. of Law of Private Corporations, rev. ed., sec. 6
and 8 ibid., sec. 4081.
81
82Uniform Business Corporation Act, sec. 11 (II) (b).
See California General Corporation Law, sec. 292, California, Civil
Code (Deering 1931) sec. 292 and Ohio General Code, (Page 1931) secs.
8623-7, Ohio, General Code, secs. 8623-7.
SSMinnesota Laws 1927, ch. 32, provides that social and charitable corporations "may have perpetual succession whenever it shall be so provided
in the certificate of incorporation." Minnesota Laws 1929, ch. 233 provides
that "religious, social, fraternal and charitable corporations shall have perpetual succession unless the duration thereof is specifically limited in the
certificate of incorporation."
"'Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 7455.
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with the modern statutes as well as with the common law rule
in this connection.
SALE OF A CORPORATION's ENTIRE

ASSETS8 5

The question as to whether less than all the shareholders of a
corporation may authorize the sale of all its assets has given rise
to much litigation and varying rules. Where the corporation is
insolvent or a losing venture, the decided cases are in agreement
-that such sale may be authorized by a majority of the shareholders. 88 Conversely, most courts hold that if the corporation is
prosperous and a going concern a single shareholder may prevent
such sale,87 on the ground that there is an implied contract between
the shareholders that the business for which the corporation was
organized shall be carried on so long as profits are being realized.88
To this latter rule there has been vigorous dissent, some courts
taking the position that all shareholders have agreed to be bound
by the will of the majority acting in good faith, 9 and that thisrule
should apply where all the assets of the corporation are sold just as
The earlier Minneto any other transaction of the corporation.
85

ch. 300.
"Sec. 35. A corporation may, by action taken at any meeting of its
board of directors, sell, lease, exchange or otherwise dispose of all or
- Minnesota Business Corporation Act, Minnesota Laws 1933,

substantially all of its property and assets, including its good will, upon
such terms and conditions and for such considerations, which may be money,
shares, bonds, or other instruments for the payment of money or other
property, as its board of directors deems expedient, when and as authorized
by the vote of holders of shares entitling them to exercise at least twothirds of the voting_ power on such proposal, or the vote of such other proportion, not less than a majority, or vote by classes, as the articles may
require, at a shareholders' meeting called for that purpose, or when authorized upon the written consent of the holders of such shares. Notice of any
such meeting shall be given to all shareholders of record whether or not
they 8shall be entitled to vote thereat."
Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Co., (1921) 254 U. S. 590, 41 Sup. Ct.
209, 65 L. Ed. 425. See Rothwell v. Robinson, (1890) 44 Minn. 538, 47
N. W.7 255.
6 Des Moines Life & Annuity Co. v. Midland Insurance Co., (D.C.

Minn. 1925) 6 F. (2d) 228.
88

See (1929) 14 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 58, 61.
"9In Beidenkopf v. Des Moines Life Insurance Co., (1913) 160 Iowa
629, 142 N. W. 434, the court said: "But the doctrine has by no means the
unanimous support of the precedents, and it has frequently been held that
its strict enforcement would neutralize the efficiency of that other and neces.sary rule to which every stockholder impliedly agrees in becoming a member of a corporation, that the management and control of the corporate
business and interest shall be -vested in the majority."
90
In Bowditch v. Jackson Co., (1912) 76 N: H. 351, 82 Atl. 1014, the
court said:
"If the majority may sell to prevent greater loss, why may they not also
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sota cases tend to support the majority rule here, but there is a
pretty clear indication in a late case, in which the precise point was
minority,
not in issue however, that the court may now prefer the
2
or, as it calls it, "the liberal rule," in this connectionY
Doubtless because of the harsh results which the majority rule
referred to reaches in some situations nearly all of the States have
enacted statutes permitting the holders of less than all of its stock
to authorize the sale of a corporation's entire assets, whether or
not the corporation is a going concern at the time of the sale. Since
1925 Minnesota has had such a statute, which authorizes the sale
upon the approval of the holders of two-thirds of the shares having
voting power. 93 The new act in this connection is substantially
like the 1925 statute, but it follows the provisions of the Ohio
Act94 in permitting the articles to provide for approval by a less
proportion than two-thirds (but not less than a majority) of the
voting power. Particularly in view of the recent attitude of the
Minnesota court toward the "liberal" rule above referred to,95
this addition was thought desirable. It is believed that the statutory method is probably not exclusive,9 6 and it would seem that a
majority, whether or not the articles so provide, may still authorize
the sale of the entire assets of a losing concern.

PROVISIONs RELATING TO DipEcos

Since the traditional and uniform policy is to vest the management of a corporation in its board of directors, 97 the statutory
provisions relating to directors are of great importance. Several
provisions of the new Minnesota Act as to directors which seem
to the writer to be of particular interest will be discussed briefly
herein.
sell to make greater gains? Bearing in mind that this is a purely business
proposition, with no public rights or duties involved, there seems to be no
substantial difference between the two cases, as a matter of principle. In
each case, the sale is made because it is of advantage to the stockholders."
9
'Particularly Small v. Minneapolis Electro Matrix Co., (1891) 45
Minn. 264, 47 N. W. 797.
92
Paterson v. Shattuck Arizona Copper Co., (1932) 186 Minn. 611, 244
N. W. 281.
93
Minnesota Laws 1925, ch. 320.
94
Ohio General Code, (Page 1931) sec. 8623-65.
95
See note 92, supra.
96Cf. Forrester v. Mining Co., (1898) 21 Mont. 544, 55 Pac. 229.
97
See Minnesota Revised Laws 1905, sec. 2858; Minnesota G. S. 1913,
sec. 6171; Minnesota G. S. 1923, sec. 7458.
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9
(a), THE APPOINTMENT OF AN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. 4--It

has long been the practice in Minnesota for the directors to appoint
an executive committee from their number, provisions for this
procedure commonly being included in the by-laws of the corporation. Most courts hold that since the directors are vested by
statute with the management of the corporation they do not come
within the rule prohibiting the delegation of authority by an agent,
and that therefore they may delegate to an executive committee
of their own number the power to do any act for the corporation
which they might perform themselves." Some courts, however,
hold- that this power may not be conferred by by-laws, so as to
permit the delegation by the directors of the complete manage100
ment of the corporation to an executive committee.
In view of the practice in Minnesota and the more or less conflicting judicial rules elsewhere as to the appointment of an executive committee, it was thought desirable that the Minnesota Act
should cover this matter. Our Act is more strict here than the
Uniform Act and the other codes recently enacted' 01 in requiring
that the action of the board in appointing an executive committee
be unanimous. This limitation was thought proper to protect the
directors representing minority interests; without it much of what
is believed to be the salutary effect of cumulative voting might
be done away with. Also our Act includes provisions similar to
those contained in the Ohio and California Acts10 2 that the execufive committee "shall act only in the interval between the meetings of the board, and shall be subject at all times to the control
and direction of the boar'd." Perhaps this is implied in the usual
statutes authorizing the appointment of an executive committee,
but it is believed better to include it specifically. Otherwise some
DSMinnesota Business Corporation Act, Minnesota Laws 1933, ch. 300.
"Sec. 27, IV (h) The board of directors may, by unanimous affirmative action of 'the entire board, designate two or more of their number to
constitute an executive committee, which, to the extent determined by unanimous affirmative action of the entire board, shall have and exercise the
authority of the board in the management of the business of the corporation. Any such executive committee shall act only in the interval between
meetings of the board, and shall be subject at all times to the control and
direction of the board."
99
Hoyt Thompson, Executors, (1859) 19 N. Y. 207.
10 OTemple v. Dodge, (1895) 89 Tex. 69, 32 S. W. 514, 33 S. W. 222.
01
See Sec. 31, III (e) Uniform Business Corporation Act; Ohio General Code, (Page 1931) sec. 8623-60; Louisiana Laws 1928, Act. 250, sec. 34
(e).
lo2California General Corporation Law, sec. 308, California Civil Code
(Deering 1931) sec. 308, Ohio General Code, (Page 1931) secs. 8623-60.
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boards of directors might think they could wholly abdicate to an
executive committee.
(b) REMOVAL OF DIRE coRs.10 3-- The Minnesota Act contains
provisions for the removal of the directors by the shareholders
with or without cause. By the common law rule directors could
not be removed except for cause.'" 4 Our cdmmittee, however, believed that where the directors are not following the wish of a
majority of the investors whom they are representing that majority should have the power of removal.
Accordingly our Act follows that of California 0l in providing
for the removal of one or more directors, with or without cause,.
upon a majority vote of the shareholders. Lest the majority use
this method to make impossible minority representation through
cumulative voting on the board the Act-provides that no director
may be removed if a sufficient number of votes are opposed to his
removal "which if then cumulatively voted at an election of the
full board would be sufficient to elect him." So limited the provisions in the new Act as to removal of directors represent a policy
that seems fair and in line with the modem tendency toward a
more direct control of officers and agents.
(c) RELATION TO CoRPORTION. 0---Another question of interest in connection with directors is that as to their measure of
duty toward the corporation. This problem has caused consid108
Minnesota Business Corporation Act, Minnesota Laws 1933, ch. 300.
"Sec. 28. I. The entire board of directors or any individual director
may be removed from office, with or without cause, by a vote of shareholders holding a majority of the shares entitled to vote at an election of directors; provided, in the case of a corporation having cumulative voting, unless
the entire board be removed, no individual director shall be removed in
case the votes of-a sufficient number of shares are cast against his removal,
which if then cumulatively voted at an electionlof the full board would be
sufficient to elect him.
II. In case the board or any one or more directors be so removed,
new directors may be elected at the same meeting. In the case of a corporation having cumulative voting, if such election is held at the same

meeting, the notice of intention to cumulate votes provided for in subdivision III of Section 25 of this Act may be given at any time prior to the
voting at such election, and in such case announcement of the giving of
such notice shall be made prior to said voting and said cumulative voting
provisions shall be applicable."
1042 Fletcher, Cyc. of Law of Private Corporations, rev. ed., Sec. 352.
1OSCalifornia General Corporation Law, sec. 310, California, Civil
Code (Deering 1931) sec. 310.

'06Minnesota Business Corporation Act, Minnesota Laws 1933, ch. 300.
"Sec. 30. Officers and directors shall discharge the duties of their respective positions in good faith, and with that diligence and care which
ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar circumstances in like
positions."
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erable difficulty in the decided cases. Some courts have held that
directors should be held to that degree of care which an ordinarily
prudent man would exercise in his own business ;107 others hold
that the proper measure is that degree of care which an ordinarily
prudent director would use under the circumstances.0 8 In cases
involving defaults of -others than the directors, where the directors
involved are sought to be held for failure to supervise adequately,
the two rules may well lead to opposite i esults. The rule last
stated is the weight of authority,0 9 and it probably represents the
case law of Minnesota, 110 although some language in the opinions
makes this not altogether sure.-"' After careful consideration the committee concluded to approve
what in effect is the majority rule above stated. It is true that the
minority rule may in some cases protect shareholders where the
majority rule will not do so. Some members of the committee
doubted the fairness to the directors of a rule requiring them to
2
exercise the same degree of care as that required of a trustee."1
But the controlling reason why the committee did not approve the
minority rule is that such rule would inevitably tend to keep men
of financial respofisibility (and, assuming that financial responsibility bears a relationship to ability, perhaps some men of extraordinary ability) off boards of directors, to the disadvantage of
the shareholders. A cause of action against a solvent director
iOlHun v. 'Carey, (1880) 82 N. Y. 65.
loSBriggs v. Spaulding, (1890) 141 U. S. 132, 11 Sup. Ct. 924, 35 L. Ed.
662.

' 0 9See Ballantine, Corporations 362."ioSee Lake Harriet State Bank v. Venie, (1917) 138 Minn. 339, 165
N. W. 225.
"'Thus in Horn Silver Mining Co. v. Ryan, (1889) 42 Minn. 196, 44
N. W. 56, the court used the following language, seemingly approving both
rules :
"The measure of care and diligence required of directors is generally
held to be such as a prudent man exercises in his own affairs. Scott v.
Depeyster, 1 Edw. Ch. 547. But, as Morawetz (1 Corp. sec. 552) justly
observes, the plain and obvious rule is that directors impliedly undertake to
use as much diligence and care as the proper performance of the duties of
-their office requires. What constitutes a proper performance of the duties
of a director is a question of fact, which must be determined in each case
in view of all the circumstances."
112This view is perhaps a bit overstated by Judge Sharswood in the
leading case of Sperings Appeal, (1872) 71 Pa. 11, 10 Am. Rep. 684:
". . It is evident that gentlemen selected by the stockholders from
their own body ought not to be judged by the same strict standard as the
agent or trustee of a private estate. Were such a rule applied, no gentle-

man of character or responsibility would be found willing to accept such
places."
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under the majority rule is vastly more valuable to the shareholders
than a cause of action under the minority rule against a director
who is insolvent. All things considered the committee thought
the interests of the shareholders and the public best served by
following the substance of the Uniform Act 113 approving the majority rule here, and, since the Minnesota cases are not altogether
clear as to the law on this point, it seemed best to ask the legislature to make that rule a part of the new Act.
COMPENSATION TO DISSENTING SHAREHOLDERS.

14

Under the provisions of the Minnesota statutes prior to the
new Act the articles of a corporation might be amended by majority vote of the shareholders "in respect of any matter which an
original certificate of a corporation of the same kind might lawfully have contained,""' 5 and the duration of a corporation might
be extended by a three-fourths stock vote." 6 The statute as to
amendments provided no method for compensating dissenting
shareholders, and as to renewal" 17 set forth no method for determining value when the parties disagreed.
The new Act provides that where amendments which substan113Sec. 33, Uniform Business Corporation Act.
"14Minnesota Business Corporation Act, Minnesota Laws 1933, ch.. 300:

"Sec, 39. I. If a corporation has authorized an amendment which substantially changes the corporate purposes or extends the duration of the
corporation, a shareholder who did not vote in favor of or consent in writing to such corporate action may, within twenty days after the date upon
which such amendment was authorized, object thereto in writing and demand payment for his shares.
"II. If, after such a demand by a shareholder, the corporation and the
shareholder cannot agree upon the fair cash value of the shares at the
time such amendment was authorized, such value shall be determined by
three disinterested appraisers, one of whom shall be named by the share-

holder, another by the corporation and a third by the two thus chosen. The
determination of a majority of the appraisers in good faith made shall be
final, and if the amount so determined is not paid by the corporation within
thirty days after it is made, such amount may be recovered in an action
by the shareholder against the corporation. The corporation shall not be
required to make payment of such amount except upon transfer to it of
the shares for which such payment was demanded and upon surrender of
the certificate or certificates evidencing the same.
"III. A shareholder shall not be entitled to payment for his shares
under the provisions of this section unless the value of the corporate assets
which would remain after such payment would be at least equal to the aggregate amount of its debts and liabilities exclusive of stated capital."
"15 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 7472. See West Duluth Land Co.
v. Northwestern Textile Co., (1929) 176 Minn. 588, 224 N. W. 245.
' 6 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 7455.
"'-See notes 83 and 84 supra.
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tially change the corporate purposes-or extend the duration of the
corporation are authorized dissenting shareholders may have their
shares appraised and receive the fair cash value thereof from the
corporation. Procedure for the transfer of the shares is set up,
and the rights of creditors are protected by the provision that dissenting shareholders shall not receive payment unless the value
of the remaining assets of the corporation "would be at least
equal to the aggregate amount of its debts and liabilities exclusive
of stated capital." These provisions, which follow in substance
the corresponding provisions of the Uniform Act"" are believed
adequately to protect the interests of both majority and minority
shareholders as well as- those of the corporation's creditors. It
should be noted in this connection that the Minnesota Act (in this
respect otherwise than the Uniform Act) does not provide for
cash payments to dissenting shareholders where all the assets of a
corporation have been sold. Here a majority of the committee
thought it best to follow the former law"19 which does not provide
for such payment. Possibly some basis for compensation in this
situation will be worked out by the courts without the aid of
Also it should be noted that the provisions of Section
statutes. 2
39 here under discussion are made applicable to dissenting share21
holders in cases of consolidation and merger.1
INVOLUNTARY

DISSOLUTION"'

There is a great deal of conflict in the decided cases as to the
lisUniform Business Corporation Act, sec. 42.

1925 Laws, chap. 320. 11Minnesota
120 See Paterson v. Shattuck Arizona Copper Co., (1932) 186 Minn. 611,
244 N. W. 281.
12iMinnesota Business Corporation Act, Minnesota Laws, 1933, ch. 300,
sec. 43.
l22Minnesota Business Corporation Act, Minnesota Laws 1933, ch. 300:
"Sec. 48. A corporation may be dissolved by involuntary proceedings in
the discretion of the court when it is made to appear:
(a) That the corporate assets are insufficient to pay when due all just
demands for which the corporation is liable; or
(b) That the objects of the corporation have wholly failed or are entirely abandoned or their accomplishment is impracticable; or
(c) That the directors or those in control of the corporation have been
guilty of fraud or mismanagement or of abuse of authority, or of persistent
unfairness toward minority shareholders; or
(d) That there is internal dissension and that two or more factions of
the shareholders in the corporation are so deadlocked that its business cannot longer be conducted with advantage to its shareholders; or
(e) That the period for which the corporation was formed has terminated, without extension."
"Sec. 49. I. A petition for involuntary dissolution of a corporation
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persons who may institute and the grounds for the involuntary
dissolution of a corporation. It has not been the general rule to
permit creditors to obtain a dissolution "since a mere creditor of
a corporation has nothing to do with the question whether a corporation shall be dissolved. 12 But the Minnesota sequestration
125
statute12 4 sets up a procedure which Judge Mitchell aptly said
"almost always results in practical dissolution," and the late Minnesota cases permit substantially the same result under the statute126 authorizing the appointment of a receiver where a corpora127
tion is "insolvent or in imminent danger of insolvency."'
Also the Minnesota courts have not followed the early rule
that equity will not decree the dissolution of a corporation upon a
shareholders' suit," 28 but have held that where there has been "prejudicial mismanagement" by those in control of a corporation the
minority shareholders may seek and obtain a dissolution in equity,
29
even though the corporation be solvent.
The committee believed that, particularly since the new Act follows to some extent the trend of the modern statutes in permitting
wide powers to be vested in the management, the provisions for
dissolution should be liberal where there have been managerial
abuses or the business has failed. As is indicated from the Minnesota decisions referred to above, this has been the tendency of the
recent cases in this jurisdiction. The general set-up of the Uniform
Act has been followed here,13 0 but our Act requires that if the dissolution be based on a deadlock between opposing factions there
also be a finding that the business of the corporation "cannot longer
may be filed by:

(a) A shareholder, or
(b) A judgment creditor after return unsatisfied of an execution on his
judgment.
I. The commencement of a proceeding for dissolution out of court
shall not affect the right of any qualified person to petition for involuntary
proceedings for dissolution."
1238 Fletcher, Cyc. of Law of Private Corporations 9172.
"14Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 8013.
"251n McKusick v. Seymour, Sabin & Co., (1892) 48 Minn. 158, 168,

50 N. W. 1114.

12Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 9389.
127See N. W. National Bank v. Michelson-Shapiro Co., (1918) 134
Minn. 422, 159 N. W. 948; O'Brien Merc. Co. v. Bay Lake Fruit Growerg

Ass'n., (1928) 173 Minn. 493, 217 N. W. 940.

126See Ballantine, Corporations 776.
129 Throing v. McDonald, (1916) 134 Minn. 148, 156 N. W. 780; Green
v. National Advertising Co., (1917) 137 Minn. 65; 162 N. W. 1056; Owens
v. Owens Co., (1924) 161 Minn. 6, 200 N. W. 845.
"s°Uniform Business Corporation Act, secs. 51 and 52.
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be conducted with advantage to its shareholders,"' 13 and requires
that the creditor bringing suit for involuntary dissolution have a
32
judgment with a return unsatisfied thereon.
COMPROMISE ARRANGEMENTS

133

To the committee it seemed desirable that some method should
be provided to compel minority creditors and minority shareholders to accept reasonable plans for corporate reorganizations where
such plans have received court approval. Possibly this power exists
even in the absence of a statute, 3 4 but so that there may be no
doubt about it the new Act provides that upon a three-fourths vote
of the group affected and the sanction of the court a compromise
arrangement looking to a corporate reorganization shall be binding on all the members of the group affected. Our Act here is
largely founded on the Uniform Act' 35 which in turn follows
the English Companies Act. 136
l13See

McGuire v. Kaysen-McGuire Co., (1931)

184 Minn. 532, 239

N. W. 599.
182A general creditor may proceed under Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sec.
9389: O'Brien Merc. Co. v. Bay Lake Fruit Growers Assn., (1928) 173
Minn. 493, 217 N; W. 940.
13 3 Minnesota Business Corporation Act, Minnesota Laws 1933, ch. 300:
"Sec. 54. 1. When a compromise or arrangement is proposed between
a corporation and its creditors or any class of them, or between the corporation and its shareholders or any class of them, or between the corporation and both creditors and shareholders or any class or classes of them, the
court may, upon the application of the corporation or of a liquidating trustee
or receiver thereof, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors, or
of the shareholders or class of shareholders, as the case may be, to be
called in such manner as the court may direct.
II. If the majority in number representing three-fourths in value of
the creditors or class of creditors, or if the shareholders or class of sharehblders holding three-fourths of the voting power of all shareholders or of
the class of shareholders, as the case may be, agree to any compromise or
arrangement or to a reorganization of the corporation as a consequence of
such compromise or arrangement, the said compromise or arrangement and
the said reorganization shall; if sanctioned by the court, be binding on all
the creditors or class of creditors, and on all the shareholders or class of
shareholders, as the case may be, and also on the corporation and its
liquidating trustee or receiver, if any.
III. If the articles of incorporation so provide, the corporation shall
not be4 subject to the provisions of this section."
'13 See Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, (1913) 228 U. S. 482, 33 Sup.
Ct. 554, 57 L. Ed. 931; Phipps v. Rock Island Railway Co., (C.C.A. 8th
Cir. 1922) 284 Fed. 945; Billig, Corporate Reorginiiation: Equity v. Bankruptcy, (1933) 17 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 237, 257 et seq.; Billig, Corporate Reorganization: Some Recent- Developments, (1933) 18 MINNESOTA
LAW REVIEW 14, 21.
13
5Uniform Business Corporation Act, sec. 59.
3
1 6Sec. 120, English Compnies Act, 1908; sec. 153 Companies Act, 129.
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CONCLUSION

Limitations of both time and space have precluded the discussion of all or nearly all the provisions of the new Act. Those discussed here, however, indicate the manner in which the committee which drafted the Act proceeded, and to some extent the reasons for the conclusions reached. It is not thought that the Minnesota Act represents the final word on the subject nor that changes
in the Act will not have to be made. Other states where the
committees have proceeded as carefully as ours have found amendments necessary, and Minnesota's experience will not be otherwise. But the Minnesota Act is believed to contain much of
what experience to date has proved helpful in this very important
field, and possibly it may prove to be of real value to the state in
the changing period through which it is going. If such should
prove to be the case, the primary purpose of those engaged in the
preparation of the new Act will have been served.

